Assessing the Applicability of the Business Judgment Rule and the  Defensive  Business Judgment Rule in the Chinese Judiciary: A Perspective on Takeover Dispute Adjudication by Weng, Charlie Xiao-chuan
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 34, Issue 1 2010 Article 5
TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL PHILIP D. REED MEMORIAL ISSUE
Assessing the Applicability of the Business
Judgment Rule and the “Defensive” Business
Judgment Rule in the Chinese Judiciary: A
Perspective on Takeover Dispute Adjudication
Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng∗
∗
Copyright c©2010 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
Assessing the Applicability of the Business
Judgment Rule and the “Defensive” Business
Judgment Rule in the Chinese Judiciary: A
Perspective on Takeover Dispute Adjudication
Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng
Abstract
Since China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (”WTO”) on November 10, 2001,
corporate China has been struggling to dismantle the inefficient management systems formed in
the era of the planned economy, and it barely survives under the more competitive market economy
environment that began to form in 1978. In order to become stronger, both before and after WTO
admission, many corporations have been trying to restructure and grow by devouring others. Part I
of this Essay provides a basic summary of the business judgment rule and the “defensive” business
judgment rule. Part II discusses some of the difficulties that Chinese courts face in adjudicating
takeover disputes, focusing on systematic problems within the judiciary: inadequate standards for
judicial appointment, lack of judges’ expertise in corporate law, and a lack of independence. Part
III analyzes the utility of the business judgment rule for takeover adjudication in China, and ar-
gues that the business judgment rule should be transplanted to Chinese courts. Finally, Part III
concludes with an examination of how the business judgment rule might be transplanted success-
fully. It calls for greater specificity within the rule itself to compensate for the lack of established
and binding precedent in this area of Chinese law, and for a policy choice to adopt ”pro-defender”
rules for the adjudication process.
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ASSESSING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE 
BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND THE 
“DEFENSIVE” BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE IN 
THE CHINESE JUDICIARY: A PERSPECTIVE ON 
TAKEOVER DISPUTE ADJUDICATION 
Charlie Xiao-chuan Weng* 
INTRODUCTION 
It is hardly news that, with GDP growth continuously in 
double digits, China has attained significance in the world 
economy. Since China’s accession to the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”) on November 10, 2001, corporate China 
has been struggling to dismantle the inefficient management 
systems formed in the era of the planned economy,1 and it barely 
survives under the more competitive market economy 
environment that began to form in 1978. 2  Some of the 
corporations formed before the accession, such as Haier Global, 
survived and have become multinational corporate behemoths, 
while the rest struggle at the edge of bankruptcy. When there are 
 
* Senior Research Fellow and Assistant Professor, East China University of Political 
Science and Law, LL.M. & S.J.D. Candidate at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. The author thanks Professor David A. Skeel and Dr. Matthew S. Erie for reading 
an earlier draft of this Essay. All errors are the author’s. 
1. See Arnaldo M. Gonçalves, China’s Swing from a Planned Soviet-Type Economy to an 
Ingenious Socialist Market Economy: An Account of 50 Years 36 (Centro Argentino de 
Estudios Internacionales, Working Paper No. 19, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=949371 (discussing the details of transforming from a planned economy to a 
market economy in China). “Planned economy” is an economic system in which the 
government controls the economy. Its most extensive form is referred to as a “command 
economy,” “centrally planned economy,” or “command and control economy.” Under 
such a system, “resource prices are in many cases distorted, failing to reflect the real 
value, as many types of resources are still priced by the state, operating on the inertia of 
the old planned economy.” Id. at 31. The central government also decides what and how 
much should be produced. See id. at 3. 
2. See Randall Peerenboom, Resistance, Revision and Retrenchment in the Transition to 
a Competitive Market Economy in China 1, 2 (La Trobe Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies 
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 2008/8, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1265114 (discussing the start of competitive market economy). 
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valuable assets remaining in a less competitive company, takeover 
is unavoidable. The “survival of the fittest” is the cliché for 
present day corporate China. 
In order to become stronger, both before and after WTO 
admission, many corporations have been trying to restructure 
and grow by devouring others. According to statistics from 
Thomas Financial, from 1997 to 2001, the number of takeover 
cases in China increased sixteen percent annually, and related 
capital increased thirty-eight percent annually.3 Before August 1, 
2008, these conglomerates were not reined in by antitrust law.4 
Even today, antitrust cases are rare due to enforcement 
problems.5  As a result, the incentives to expand intensified. 
Takeover is the usual way for companies to expand. Especially 
considering the current financial crisis, Chinese companies have 
more incentives to merge with other companies, both domestic 
and offshore, because the different banking business structure6 
 
3. Qu Dongmei, Gongsi Shougou Zhong Mubiao Gongsi Dongshi Xinyi Yiwu Chutan (公
司收购中目标公司董事信义义务初探) [Initiative Investigation on Directors’ Fiduciary Duty of 
Target Company in Takeover], 4 J. SHANDONG NORMAL U. 76, 76 (2004). 
4. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fanlongduan Fa (中华人民共和国反垄断法) 
[Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008), translated in 
Isinolaw, available at http://www.isinolaw.com/isinolaw/english/detail.jsp?searchword=
STATUTES_EN_TITLE%3Danti%5C-monopoly+law+and+catalog%3D0&channelid=
76608&record=1&iscatalog=0&statutes_id=10027537&skind=110 (last visited Jan. 24, 
2010). 
5. See Zheng Na, Woguo Fanlongduan Zhifa Tizhi Xianzhuang ji qi Pingxi (我国反垄断
执法体制现状及其评析) [The Situation of Enforcement System of Antitrust Law and Comments 
of China], 3 JINKA GONGCHENG [J.K.G.C.] 122, 122 (2009). Pursuant to the Antitrust Law 
of the People’s Republic of China, the central government should establish an antitrust 
committee to enforce the law. However, the committee was not created until September 
2009. See id. Additionally, the antitrust law does not articulate the power of the antitrust 
committee, which obstructs the implementation of the law. See Gui Liyi & Sun Wenying, 
Fanlongduan Zhifa Jigou Wenti Yanjiu (反垄断执法机构问题研究) [Study of Antitrust Law 
Enforcement Authorities], 3 JINGJI YU FA [J.J.Y.F.] 5, 5 (2009). 
6 . The Chinese banking structure is both highly regulated and relatively 
underdeveloped. Savings and loan is the main business of Chinese banks; however, the 
business has recently begun to expand rapidly as monetary policy becomes integral to 
China’s overall economic policy. As a result, banks are becoming more important to 
China’s economy by increasingly providing more financing to enterprises for 
investment, seeking deposits from the public to mop up excess liquidity, and lending 
money to the government. Most important is that most derivatives and means of 
structured finance, such as securitization, which is the prime culprit of the current 
worldwide financial crisis, are brand new businesses for Chinese banks, and many 
structured finance projects are still in the experimental stage. When corporate America 
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has shielded most of the crucial financial institutions from the 
brunt of the crisis. Moreover, the depreciation of the US dollar 
against the renminbi (RMB) lowers the cost of taking over foreign 
companies.7 The current situation of corporate China is similar 
to that of corporate America during the New Deal Era, where the 
central government tries to employ money supply and 
regulations to enhance its control over the whole economy.8 
Given that excessive competition had caused inefficiency and 
wasted social resources at the beginning of the “Open Door” 
policy, the government has not only loosened the standard of 
monopoly in non-utilities industries, but it has also facilitated and 
encouraged takeovers in order to decrease excessive 
competition.9 As more conglomerates become major players in 
 
is suffering from a funding crisis, Chinese banks have more than enough money 
absorbed from the public to lend. 
7. For instance, the chief of the National Energy Bureau is quoted as saying, 
“Under the global financial crisis, we should expedite the expansion of energy 
industry.” Peter Ford, Zhongguo Jie Quanqiu Shuaitui Haiwai Da Shougou (中国借全球衰退
海外大收购) [China’s Global Takeover under Current Recession], HNCE, Feb. 26, 2009, 
http://news.hnce.com.cn/c/2009-02-26/6867.shtml. The second biggest domestic 
energy conglomerate, China Petroleum Chemical Corporation, is taking over a 
Canadian petroleum company, Tanganyika Oil. The biggest Chinese mining company, 
China Minmetals Corporation, is trying to buy out an Australian mining company, OZ 
Minerals. Id. The deputy chairman of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission said 
the biggest Chinese life insurance company, China Life Insurance (Group) Company, is 
currently negotiating with American International Group (“AIG”) about a potential 
takeover of an Asian subsidiary of AIG. See Baojian Huicheng Goushou Zheng Shangtao 
Shougou AIG Yazhou Zichan (保监会称国寿正商讨收购 AIG 亚洲资产 ) [Insurance 
Supervision Committee: China Life Insurance Considering Buyout of AIG Asian Assets], SINA, 
Feb. 26, 2009, http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/hkstock/redchipsnews/
20090226/15275905739.shtml. China’s biggest petroleum refinery company, China 
National Petroleum Corporation (“CNPC”), reached a takeover agreement with 
Verenex Energy Inc. See Zhongguo Shiyou Ni 4 Yi Meiyuan Shougou Verenex (中国石油拟 4
亿美元收购油气公司 Verenex) [CNPC Plans USD 400 million Buyout of Oil and Gas 
Company, Verenex], FINANCE.IFENG.COM, Feb. 26, 2009, http://finance.ifeng.com/zq/
ssgs/20090227/408327.shtml. 
8. See Gonçalves, supra note 1, at 33–34 (“[T]he state continues to have an almost 
omnipresent role in all aspects of economic life, throughout administrative regulation 
and direction, macro-coordination of state enterprises and fixing some market price.”); 
Objective of the Monetary Supply, THE PEOPLE’S BANK OF CHINA, http://www.pbc.gov.cn/
english/huobizhengce/objective.asp (last visited Sept. 11, 2010) (“The objective of the 
monetary policy is to maintain the stability of the value of the currency and thereby 
promote economic growth.”). 
9. See Bruce M. Owen et al., China’s Competition Policy Reforms: The Anti-Monopoly 
Law and Beyond, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 247–50 (2008); China’s New Takeover Rules Spur 
More Mergers and Acquisitions, SIEGLE, HU & PARTNERS INT’L, http://www.siegle-hu.com/
new/index_01_4.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2010). 
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the market, their takeovers have attracted greater public 
attention. With the takeover boom, corporations are bringing 
more disputes arising from takeovers to the judiciary. 
Most takeover cases focus on the breach of the duty of care 
or loyalty and poor corporate governance, such as executives’ 
excessive risk-taking and cronyism. In the typical situation, the 
company’s stock prices drop significantly after a merger or 
acquisition. Many stockholders, who plan to turn to the much 
more profitable and stable real estate market, desperately want 
their money back. Spurred on by lawyers, just as in the United 
States, they seek recovery in a court of law. In hearings, judges 
usually find that the fiduciary rules are vague at best, making it 
difficult for them to make business decisions in the shoes of 
directors. The scarcity of fiduciary regulations and of well-trained 
business judges in China contributes to the current adjudication 
predicament. Moreover legislative and judicial training issues 
cannot be solved in a short period of time. Transplanting the 
modified business judgment rule and the “defensive” business 
judgment rule is the Alexandrian solution. This will not only 
circumvent the regulations predicament, but this will also help 
judges make less disputable decisions. 
Part I of this Essay provides a basic summary of the business 
judgment rule and the “defensive” business judgment rule. Part 
II discusses some of the difficulties that Chinese courts face in 
adjudicating takeover disputes, focusing on systemic problems 
within the judiciary: inadequate standards for judicial 
appointment, lack of judges’ expertise in corporate law, and a 
lack of independence. Part III analyzes the utility of the business 
judgment rule for takeover adjudication in China, and argues 
that the business judgment rule should be transplanted to 
Chinese courts. Finally, Part III concludes with an examination of 
how the business judgment rule might be transplanted 
successfully. It calls for greater specificity within the rule itself to 
compensate for the lack of established and binding precedent in 
this area of Chinese law, and for a policy choice to adopt “pro-
defender” rules for the adjudication process. 
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I. DEFINING THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND THE 
“DEFENSIVE” BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE? 
A. The Business Judgment Rule 
Before discussing the “defensive” business judgment rule, 
the business judgment rule must first be examined because the 
former was developed on the theory of the latter. The business 
judgment rule was introduced as a common law standard of 
review more than 180 years ago.10 It has been viewed as the 
principle that directors can employ to shield their decisions from 
judicial scrutiny.11 
Applied to daily life, the standard of conduct and the 
standard of review for that conduct may seem similar.12 For 
instance, a crane operator should operate the machine carefully. 
That is the standard of conduct for the operator. 
Correspondingly, to decide whether the crane operator is liable 
for a claim, the question is whether he operated the machinery 
carefully. However, the duty of care for directors of a corporation 
is different. The standard of conduct applicable to directors and 
officers of US corporations is set forth in Section 4.01(a) of the 
American Law Institute’s Principles of Corporate Governance.13 
It is a fairly demanding standard, but the standard of review 
applied to the performance of these duties, the business 
judgment rule, is less stringent.14 When directors’ and officers’ 
 
10. See S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 
93 (1979). 
11. See Joseph Hinsey, IV, Business Judgment and the American Law Institute’s Corporate 
Governance Project: The Rule, the Doctrine and the Reality, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 609, 610 
(1985). 
12 . See MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS 544 (2000). The standard of conduct is how an actor should act 
under certain circumstances, while the standard of review is the caliber courts 
should apply to gauge whether to impose liability. See id. 
13 . Section 4.01(a) of American Law Institute Principles of Corporate 
Governance reads:  
A director or officer has a duty to the corporation to perform the director’s or 
officer’s functions in good faith, in a manner that he or she reasonably 
believes to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the care that an 
ordinarily prudent person would reasonably be expected to exercise in a like 
position and under similar circumstances. 
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.01(a) (1994). 
14. See EISENBERG, supra note 12, at 545. 
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decisions are called into question, four conditions must be met 
for the business judgment rule to apply: (1) directors must have 
made a decision; generally, the rule is inapplicable to an 
omission; (2) directors may not have an interest, financial or 
familial, in the subject of the business decision; if the interest will 
reasonably be expected to affect their judgment, the standard of 
review will be heightened and the business judgment rule will not 
apply; (3) directors must have employed a reasonable decision-
making process; this is the justification that enables directors to 
reasonably make appropriate decisions; and (4) decisions should 
be made in good faith; if the decision breaches the law, the 
business judgment rule is inapplicable.15 One of the most salient 
issues is why the business judgment rule enables directors to 
shield themselves from more exacting levels of review once the 
conditions are met. Is it because directors are a preferential 
group to the legislature? The answer is no. 
The most significant contribution of the business judgment 
rule is that it prevents the judiciary from meddling in managerial 
decisions. Even if most judges are learned and experienced, they 
cannot assert that they know the market and business better than 
the directors and officers. It is much wiser to have courts 
scrutinize how the board made a decision rather than make a 
business decision on their own. In most cases, business decisions 
are “necessarily made on the basis of incomplete information 
and in the face of obvious risk, so that typically a range of 
decisions is reasonable.”16 It is wrong to say directors or officers 
made a bad decision if they reasonably assessed the risk and 
made a calculated decision, even if the outcome turned out to be 
a failure. If judges are allowed to interfere with business 
judgments, they will inevitably be influenced by hindsight and 
make a biased decision.17 For example, suppose a board decides 
 
15. Id. at 540, 545. 
16. Melvin Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review 
in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 444 (1993). 
17. Experimental psychology has shown that in hindsight, people consistently 
arrive at an outcome that could have been anticipated in foresight. See ROBYN M. DAWES, 
RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 119–20 (1988); Baruch Fischhoff, For Those 
Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 335, 341–43 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); 
Baruch Fischhoff & Ruth Beyth, “I Knew It Would Happen”: Remembered Probabilities of 
Once-Future Things, 13 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. PERFORMANCE 1, 1–16 
(1975). 
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to acquire a small company that is processing a lucrative patent. 
After the merger, the patent is barred by a newly enacted law 
because of an environmental protest. If the board has the chance 
to remake the decision, it most likely will not choose the buyout. 
However, the court cannot look to the result to say that it is a bad 
decision. 
Nothing ventured, as the cliché puts it, nothing gained. The 
business judgment rule is usually described as “a presumption 
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation 
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest 
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the 
company.”18 The people the legislature intends to rein in are 
those who expose the corporation to excessive risk. There is 
nothing improper with companies taking elaborate and strategic 
risk.19 Shareholders pursue risks as well. Establishing the same 
standard of review as the standard of conduct would be 
draconian and economically inefficient. It is crucial to keep and 
curb directors’ enthusiasm of taking risk rather than exterminate 
it. Keeping the appropriate tension between accountability and 
authority facilitates better performance of both directors and 
officers.20 In fact, it is very hard to distinguish between bad 
decisions and good decisions from the perspective of the courts, 
as mentioned above. If liabilities are unfairly imposed against 
directors and officers by applying the reasonableness standard, 
they might tend to be unduly risk-averse. 21  The business 
judgment rule helps to dampen that tendency. 
B. The Heightened Hurdle: The “Defensive” Business Judgment Rule 
In US corporate law, the “defensive” business judgment rule 
does not exist as an explicit black letter rule; takeover regulation 
in the United States is an amalgam of state laws and judicial 
decisions. It is impossible to epitomize the whole galaxy of rules 
into one short proper term. Therefore, the term the “defensive” 
business judgment rule is borrowed to depict this amalgam for 
 
18. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
19. See DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN 
CORPORATE AMERICA 205 (2005). 
20. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 
VAND. L. REV. 83, 108 (2004). 
21. See Eisenberg, supra note 16, at 445. 
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purposes of this Essay. The reason for employing the term, rather 
than others, is that it is the business judgment rule that paved the 
way for the rules for the board of the target company.22 The 
review of the board’s decision is limited and not completely 
substantive, which can be regarded as the “gene” left by the 
business judgment rule. After the merger of the different 
standards, the business judgment rule was heightened and a 
galaxy of rules was promulgated for the target corporation. 
Why did the legislature and judiciary heighten the hurdle 
and require directors and officers to prove more? The reason is 
that the core values of these takeover cases are much closer to 
stockholder ownership rights and values than those tackled by 
the business judgment rule. Most takeover disputes arise in an 
injunction proceeding, a posture which is referred to as 
“transactional justification.”23 In the typical business judgment 
rule case, almost all the decisions directors or officers make are 
enterprise or operational issues (such as whether the company 
needs to buy a new machine or whether it will issue bonds or new 
shares),24 while in “transactional justification” cases, issues more 
directly point to stockholder ownership rights and values. The 
“defensive” business judgment rule protects the decision itself, 
rather than the decision-makers.25 The legislature and judiciary 
purport to exhaustively protect the shareholders’ rudimentary 
rights through the heightened hurdle, rather than protecting 
directors and officers, which is the basic value for the business 
judgment rule. 
One begins an analysis of the “defensive” business judgment 
rule in Delaware corporate law26 because it is the most influential 
corporate law in the United States.27 The most significant sources 
 
22. See E. Norman Veasey, The New Incarnation of the Business Judgment Rule in 
Takeover Defenses, 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. 503, 505–12 (1986). 
23. See id. at 506. 
24. See id.; see also Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1259 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boardroom 
after Van Gorkom, 41 BUS. LAW. 1, 4 (1985). 
25. See Veasey, supra note 22, at 506; see also Hinsey, supra note 11, at 609, 611–13. 
26. The William Act and other states’ statutes are outside the context of this Essay. 
27. See Brian E. Rosenzweig, Private Versus Public Regulation: A Comparative Analysis 
of British and American Takeover Controls, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 213, 229 (2007); see 
also CHRISTIN M. FORSTINGER, TAKEOVER LAW IN THE EU AND THE USA: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 17 (2002); John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile 
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of the “defensive” business judgment rule in Delaware are several 
renowned takeover judiciary decisions. The Delaware Supreme 
Court in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. held that the board of 
directors had wide latitude to take effective measures to protect 
its firms from being taken over.28 The court upheld the legality of 
employing a self-tender that discriminated against the bidder.29 
Moreover, the court said a board should respond reasonably to 
any threat posed, but may not take steps which are “draconian” 
in defending against a takeover.30 In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & 
Forbes Holdings, Inc.,31 the Delaware Supreme Court held that 
once the board decides to sell the company, the director’s duty 
will shift to pursuing “the highest price for the benefit of the 
stockholders.” 32  Furthermore, two cases from the 1990s, 
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc.33 and Unitrin, 
Inc. v. American General Corp.,34 changed the “defensive” business 
judgment rule from a formal instruction to a more substantive 
standard of review. 35  These decisions apply an intermediate 
standard between the business judgment rule and the intrinsic 
fairness test. However, they are much closer to judicial deference 
than strict scrutiny. 36  After all, they bourgeoned from the 
business judgment rule and have the diacritical business 
judgment rule stamp. 
II. ISSUES OF TAKEOVER ADJUDICATION 
With the takeover wave ratcheting up in China, problems 
have begun to emerge. The legislature and judiciary are seeking 
 
Takeovers, and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. 
L.J. 1727, 1755 (2007). 
28. 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985). 
29. Id. at 958–59. 
30. Id. at 955. 
31. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985). 
32. Id. at 182. 
33. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
34. 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995). 
35. Id. at 1388; Paramount Communications, 637 A.2d at 45; see also Ronald J. Gilson 
& Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There 
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247, 252 (1989) (discussing the 
substance of a new defensive standard of review); Jennifer J. Johnson & Mary Siegel, 
Note, Corporate Mergers: Redefining the Role of Target Directors, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315, 332–
37 (1987). 
36. See William Magnuson, Takeover Regulation in the United States and Europe: An 
Institutional Approach, 21 PACE INT’L L. REV. 205, 216 (2009). 
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a better way to strengthen the ability of the court to properly 
solve related takeover disputes. Especially given the current 
political discourse on “Harmonious Society” (hexie shehui);37 it is 
in the best interests of the central government to avoid a 
situation whereby thousands of stockholders curse at 
unscrupulous and reckless directors and unfair judicial decisions 
at the gates of government facilities.  
In reforming China’s legal regime to better deal with 
takeovers, there are three main issues. First, the processes of 
judicial nomination and the operation of the judiciary affects 
judicial efficacy in takeover cases as a whole.38 Second, local 
protectionism jeopardizes the independence of the local 
judiciary in related influential takeover cases.39 Third, the scarcity 
of legislation on duty of care is the main cause of long-term 
pending takeover cases. 
A. The Corporate Court of Takeover Cases 
Although judicial reform in the late 1970s enabled China to 
learn advanced legal ideas from abroad, system-wide problems in 
the nomination and functioning of the judiciary continues to 
cause endemic injustice.40  Regarding the judiciary, the three 
most crucial issues are low standards for judicial nomination, 
inefficient job rotation, and systemic deprivation of 
independence. Professionalization and independence are the 
most crucial issues to the justice of the corporate court. 
 
37. The construction of a “Harmonious Society” (hexie shehui) is a socio-economic 
vision that is said to be the result of Chinese leader Hu Jintao‘s signature ideology of the 
Scientific Development Concept. Recently, Chinese authorities have responded to social 
unrest by tightening controls and drafting laws to placate society’s ire towards corrupt 
government and corporations. See Maureen Fan, China’s Party Leadership Declares New 
Priority: ‘Harmonious Society’: Doctrine Proposed by President Hu Formally Endorsed, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 12, 2006, at A18. 
38. This problem is poisoning the whole judiciary rather than just the corporate 
court. See He Weifang, Zouxiang Sifa Gongzheng de Ba Yaojian (走向司法公正的八要件) 
[The Eight Essentials Towards Judicial Justice], 3 DONGBEI ZHI CHUANG [D.Z.C.] 20, 20 
(2007), available at http://lawlover.fyfz.cn/art/635974.htm. 
39. See id. 
40. See Jonas Grimheden, The Reform Path of the Chinese Judiciary: Progress or Stand-
Still?, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1000, 1006 (2007). 
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The current judicial law’s low standards for judicial 
nomination are wildly criticized in legal academia.41 The revised 
judicial law of 2001 stipulates that the starting age for a person 
eligible to be nominated as a judge is twenty-three, regardless of 
whether he or she graduated from law school.42 The average age 
of judges in many courts, especially in more developed areas of 
China, is under thirty-five because all the newly nominated 
judges finished the two-year probational assistant adjudicator 
period immediately after graduation from college with a 
bachelor’s degree. Of the 190,000 judges in China, 59,000, 
representing thirty-one percent, have received formal full-time 
legal training. 43  A significant amount of judges majored in 
history, literature, or chemistry in college and received little 
formal legal education. Although revisions to the judicial law in 
2001 included passing the uniformed bar exam as an entrance 
requirement to be designated as a judge,44 it seems that the exam 
has become an alternate way for judges to leave the judiciary and 
 
41. See Hu Bing & Wang Yang, Lun Gaige he Wanshan Woguo de Faguan Zhidu (论改
革和完善我国的法官制度) [Reforming and Improving China’s Judge System], 11 PUB. 
ADMIN. & L. 39, 39 (2009); Yuan Yuan, Lun Woguo Faguan Linxuan Zhidu zhi Youhua (论
我国法官遴选制度之优化) [Institutional Analysis on China’s Judges Nomination], 3 FAZHI YU 
SHEHUI 142, 142 (2008); see also He Weifang, Zhongguo Fayuan Gaige yu Sifa Duli: Yige 
Canyuzhe de Guancha yu Fansi (中国法院改革与司法独立：一个参与者的观察与反思) 
[The Reformation and Independency of China’s Judiciary: Observation and Introspection from a 
Participant], 2 ZHEJIANG SHE HUI KE XUE 83, 85 (2003). 
42. Article 9 of the Judge Law stipulates that a judge shall: (1) be a citizen of the 
People’s Republic of China; (2) have reached the age of twenty-three; (3) endorse the 
Constitution of the People’s Republic of China; (4) have fine political and professional 
quality and be good in conduct; (5) be in good health; (6) have worked in law for at 
least two years in the case of a graduate from a four-year law course at an institution of 
higher education, or a graduate from a four-year course in a non-law specialty of such an 
institution that possesses the professional knowledge of law, and have worked in law for 
at least three years in the case of the said graduate to be appointed judge of a Higher 
People’s Court or the Supreme People’s Court; and (7) have worked in law for at least 
one year in the case of a person holding a Master of Law or Doctor of Law degree; or a 
person holding a master’s degree or doctor’s degree of a non-law specialty who possesses 
the professional knowledge of law, and to have worked in law for at least two years in the 
case of the said person to be appointed judge of a Higher People’s Court or the 
Supreme People’s Court. See Judges Law of the People Republic of China (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb 28, 1995, effective July 1, 1995, revised 
June 30, 2001), translated in Isinolaw (last visited Jan. 16, 2010). 
43. See Kuikui, Zhongguo Faguan Xueli Kao (中国法官学历考) [A Survey of the 
Educational Background of Chinese Judges] (July 20, 2009, 10:35 AM), 
http://gk1984123.fyfz.cn/blog/gk1984123/index.aspx?blogid=498512. 
44. See ZOU KEYUAN, CHINA’S LEGAL REFORM: TOWARDS THE RULE OF LAW 209–10 
(2006). 
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earn more money as lawyers.45 The majority of judges are young 
people under thirty, to whom income generally matters more 
than upholding social justice. Additionally, China still has a 
policy in place that allows for those who served in the military to 
be assigned to the court as a retirement benefit.46 The effect, in 
the aggregate, is to reduce the proportion of judges with formal 
legal education. 
Inefficient job rotation is the second problem that impairs 
the professionalization of corporate judges. All courts at every 
level are divided into specialized divisions, such as civil and 
criminal, for the convenience of specialized adjudication. No 
judge, however, can sit in a division more than eight years. After 
a given term, a judge may sit in another division.47 The policy 
purports to reduce corruption within the judiciary by limiting the 
influence of fellow judges who have become acquaintances after 
serving together for a long time. However, this rotation causes a 
significant  waste  of  professional  knowledge.48 The  rotations 
create disincentives for judges to perform in-depth research on 
complex areas of corporate law, knowing that they will soon be 
rotated out. It is very hard for an experienced criminal judge, for 
example, to adjudicate a takeover case proficiently because 
corporate cases, especially takeover cases, involve highly 
 
45. Before the qualification tests were unified, judges and lawyers had separate 
admissions tests. Although the unified qualification test has widely been recognized as 
harder than the former judge admission test, it has caused many young judges, now 
qualified to practice as lawyers, to leave the court for higher pay at law firms. See Suli (苏
力), Faguan Linxuan Zhidu Kaocha (法官遴选制度考察 ) [A Probe into the Judge Selection 
System], 3 FAXUE YUEKAN 3, 4–8 (2004). 
46. See He Weifang (贺卫方), Fuzhuan Junren Jin Fayuan (复转军人进法院) [Retired 
Military Officers Going to the Judiciary], NANFANG ZHOUMO, Jan. 2, 1998, available at 
http://article.china.lawinfo.com/Article_Detail.asp?ArticleId=26402; 
Taroh Inoue, Introduction to International Commercial Arbitration in China, 36 H.K.L.J. 171, 
193 (2006). 
47. See Renmin Fayuan Wunian Gaige Gangyao (1999–2003) (人民法院五年改革纲
要 (1999–2003)) [Five Year Reform Platform (1999–2003)] (promulgated by the Sup. 
People’s Ct., Oct. 20, 1999), http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/xf/200511/
20051128111114.htm; Renmin Fayuan Dierge Wunian Gaige Gangyao (2004–2008) (人
民法院第二个五年改革纲要 (2004–2008)) [The Second Five Year Reform Platform 
(2004–2008)] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Oct. 26, 2005), 
http://www.dffy.com/faguixiazai/xf/200512/20051214221735-2.htm; Renmin Fayuan 
Disange Wunian Gaige Gangyao (2009–2013) (人民法院第三个五年改革纲要 (2009–
2013)) [The Third Five Year Reform Platform (2009–2013)] (promulgated by the Sup. 
People’s Ct., Mar. 17, 2009), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/200903/26/
content_11074127_3.htm. 
48. See Suli, supra note 45, at 16–18. 
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specialized legal issues. A range of specialized knowledge, such as 
accounting and finance, is required of the fact-finder. Some 
jurisdictions in the United States have even established a 
specialized court for corporate case adjudication, such as the 
Delaware Court of Chancery.49 
Independence is a third problem for the Chinese corporate 
court. There are several factors that affect the independence of 
the judiciary. The first is the job rotations issue mentioned above. 
Different positions offer different incomes and career prospects. 
Some judges may be assigned to hear socially influential cases, 
whereas others will only handle the administration of petitions, 
which is regarded as an inferior office in the court. Second, there 
is no judge position with life tenure. Male judges must retire at 
age sixty and female judges at age fifty-five.50 Older people often 
have lower living costs, such as housing payments, than young 
people do. However, just when judges are less likely to ask for 
pecuniary benefit, they have to leave the court.51 Third, the court 
system is generally enveloped in a strong bureaucratic 
atmosphere. The annual judge performance evaluation still 
employs the same system used to evaluate government officials.52 
As a result, when adjudicating cases relating to government 
interests, judges can hardly remain impartial. A very clear-cut 
administrative hierarchy makes judges’ acts abide by the 
suggestions of their superiors for a better career development 
 
49. See ABA Ad Hoc Committee on Business Courts, Business Courts: Towards a More 
Efficient Judiciary, 52 BUS. LAW. 947, 955–59 (1997). 
50. See Guowuyuan guanyu Anzhi Lao, Ruo, Bing, Can Ganbu de Zanxing Banfa 
( 国务院关于安置老、弱、病、残干部的暂行办法) [Interim Measures of the State 
Counsel on the Placement of Old, Weak, Sick or Disabled Cadres] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 2, 1978), http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2009-
06/23/content_1348573.htm; Guowuyuan guanyu Gongren Tuixiu, Tuizhi de Zanxing 
Banfa (国务院关于工人退休、退职的暂行办法) [Interim Measures of the State Counsel 
on the Retirement and Resignation of Workers] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., June 2, 1978), http://law.cctv.com/program/xyh/topic/C19562/
20071017/104947.shtml. 
51. See Suli, supra note 38, at 23. 
52. Judges will not only be evaluated internally by court officials, but also by the 
government’s human resources department. See Peng Junfeng, Faguan Kaoping Zhidu 
Yanjiu (法官考评制度研究) [Research on the Evaluation System of Judges], 3 CHUANGYE KEJI 
YUEKAN (创业科技月刊) [PIONEERING WITH SCI. & TECH. MONTHLY] 129, 129 (2009). 
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path.53 Judges waiting for guidance from their superiors before 
deciding widely influential cases is not a rare occurrence.  
B. The Dilemma of the Judiciary 
The factors affecting the independence of individual judges 
apply to the judiciary as a whole. The judiciary is not 
independently funded, nor does it fund itself;54 rather, it receives 
funding and other resources from local governments. It is 
common for local authorities to try to influence takeover cases 
relating to government assets or affecting the local 
unemployment rate. Almost all judicial decisions on such 
disputes have a significant impact on the local economy. If a 
judge intends to rule in favor of a non-local company, he will 
have second thoughts because local revenue is the source of his 
salary.55  Therefore,  local  influence  still  undermines  the 
credibility of the judiciary.56 
Pursuant to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of 
China (“PRC”), it may be legal for political groups to interfere 
with judicial power.57 There are no special regulations to curb 
 
53. See Song Ruiping, Shilun Woguo Faguan Duli Zhidu zhi Lixiang Jiangou ( 试论我国
法官独立制度之理想建构) [Discussion on the Optimal Development of China’s Independent 
Judiciary System], 6 ZHONGGONG ZHENGZHOU SHI WEIDANG XIAO XUEBAO 221, 222–23 
(2008). 
54. See Grimheden, supra note 40, at 1011. 
55. Although there were rumors about the central government funding local courts 
from the central revenue in 2009, there has been no official statement on this to date. 
See Chen Huan, Jiceng Fayuan Jingfei jiang Naru Zhongyang Yusuan (基层法院经费将纳入
中央预算) [Local Courts to be Funded by the National Treasury], NEWS.163, Dec. 5, 2008, 
http://news.163.com/08/1205/05/4SCKC2QD0001124J.html. 
56. See Grimheden, supra note 40, at 1011; see also Randall Peerenboom, Judicial 
Independence in China 2, 32–33 (2006) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
57. See XIANFA art. 126 (1986). Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa ( 中华人民
共和国宪法) [The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China] is the Constitution of 
the People’s Republic of China (“PRC”). Article 126 reads, “The people’s courts shall, 
in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power independently and are not subject to 
interference by administrative organs, public organizations or individuals.” Id. Thus, it 
does not exclude interference from a political group. Therefore, some scholars 
speculate that this provision is the legal justification for interference. See, e.g., Xie 
Shiping, Lun Wo Guo Shen Pan Quan Di Fang Hua Ji Qi Jie Jue: Jian Ping Xianfa Di 126 
Tiao (论我国的审判权地方化及其解决—兼评《宪法》第 126 条) [On the Localism of 
China s Judicial Power and Its Solution—Along with the Provision 126 in China’s Constitution], 
2 HENAN ZHI YE SIFA JING GUAN XUEYUAN XUEBAO 82, 84 (2005); see also Zhou Yongkun, 
Guan Yu Xiu Gai Xian Fa Di 126 Tiao De Jian Yi (关于修改宪法第 126 条的建议) 
[Suggestion on Revising Provision 126 of Constitution], 19 JIANGSU JINGGUAN XUE YUAN 
XUEBAO 62 (2004). 
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the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP” or “Party”) from 
exercising this power (the CCP is the only party in office and can 
impose political influence on the judiciary). As to local courts, 
“[p]arty influence at the local level is not always the central party 
line, but can also be that of the local government or other local 
interest.”58  Based  on  the  constitutional  provision,  local 
government or other interests influence the judiciary through 
the Political & Legal Committee (“PLC”) (zhenfa weiyuanhui), 
which “is the body that plays a decisive role in establishing the 
finality of a judgment in China.”59 If the result of a decision will 
significantly reduce or increase the local unemployment rate or 
revenue, the local branch of the Party is inclined to meddle in 
the judicial decision by calling PLC meetings. Usually, the head 
of the court is a member of the PLC, who will be persuaded by 
the committee to consider “social harmony and peace” (shehui 
hexie he anding). Party influence is always irresistible, as evidenced 
by the powerlessness of the Supreme People’s Court to prevent 
former members of the military from serving in the judiciary.60 
Additionally, funding provides extra leverage for the local 
government and other interests to influence local courts. Given 
that all of the expenses of local courts are paid from a share of 
local government revenue, rather than the national revenue,61 it 
is impossible for a local court to refuse a request from the local 
government when it is bargaining for a favorable judgment. 
C. Legislation on the Duty of Care 
In corporate litigation, fiduciary duty is the main vehicle 
used to rein in irresponsible and reckless behavior of directors 
and officers. Although law on the duty of care is messy at best, 
many US scholars have successfully crafted a unified theory of 
 
58. Grimheden, supra note 40, at 1011. 
59. Nanping Liu, A Vulnerable Justice: Finality of Civil Judgments in China, 13 COLUM. 
J. ASIAN L. 35, 88 (1999). 
60. See Weifang, supra note 41, at 85. 
61. See Yang Yihong, Lun Faguan Duli Shenpan de Zhiyuexing Yinsu ji qi Xiaojie: Dui 
Xiugai Woguo Renmin Fayuan Zuzhi Fa Disitiao de Sikao (论法官独立审判的制约性因素及
其消解：对修改我国人民法院组织法第四条的思考) [Discussing the Factors Restricting the 
Independency of Court Adjudication and Their Solutions: Thoughts on the Modification of Article 
4 of China’s Organic Law of the People’s Courts], 3 ZHONGZHOU XUEKAN 113, 115 (2007). 
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fiduciary duty.62 In 2005, the Company Law of the PRC was 
amended; however, there is only one provision related to the 
duty of care.63 Given that no decision is binding precedent in the 
jurisdiction, the meager treatment of the duty of care in 
legislation is a critical problem in the adjudication of takeover 
cases.64 
Pursuant to Article 148 of the amended Company Law: 
The directors, supervisors and senior executives of a 
company shall comply with the laws, administrative 
regulations and the articles of association of the company, 
and bear the duties of loyalty and due diligence towards the 
company. The directors, supervisors and senior executives of 
a company shall not, by taking advantage of their positions 
and powers, accept bribes or other unlawful incomes, nor 
may they misappropriate the property of the company.65 
Article 148 is the only provision in the newly promulgated 
company law related to the duty of care. Although there are 
other regulations, such as the 2008 Law of the People’s Republic 
of China  on  the State-Owned  Assets of  Enterprises,66 which 
applies only to the directors, controlling shareholders, and actual 
controllers67 of State Owned Companies (“SOCs”); and the 2008 
Measures for the Administration of the Takeover of Listed 
Companies,68 these regulations are not fully enforced because 
 
62. See, e.g., Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1399 (2002). 
63. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Company 
Law] art. 148 (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, 
revised Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.gov.cn/ziliao/flfg/2005-10/28/content_85478.htm. 
64. See Hu Xiaoke, Lun Woguo “Gongsi Fa” Xiugai Zhong dui Dongshi Zhuyi Yiwu 
Guize de Wanshan: Jianxi Yewu Panduan Guize dui Dongshi Zhuyi Yiwu de Pingheng (论我国
《公司法》修改中对董事注意义务规则的完善：兼析业务判断规则对董事注意义务的平
衡) [The Revision of the “Company Law” and the Directors’ Duty of Care: Analysis on the 
Business Judgment Rule], 4 ZHONGYANG CAIJING DAXUE XUEBAO 76, 79 (2004). 
65. Company Law art. 148. 
66. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Guoyou Qiye Zichan Fa (中华人民共和国国
有企业资产法) [The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-Owned Assets 
of Enterprises] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 
2000, effective May 1, 2009), http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2008-10/28/content_
1134207.htm. 
67. “Actual controller” shall mean any person who is not a shareholder of a 
company but can control the company's acts through investment relationships, 
agreements or other arrangements. Company Law art. 217. 
68. Only a few articles, such as Article 8, are related to the duty of care of directors, 
controlling shareholders, and actual controllers in the target company and the bidding 
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they lack a systematic logic and integrity, and they are not 
specific enough for judges to apply. Because of the gaps in the 
legislation, many problems occur in the takeover process. In 
many cases, directors and controllers substantially 
misappropriate a corporation’s assets for their own benefit. 
Sometimes the board of directors of the target company rejects a 
substantially good tender offer and prefers a less beneficial one 
because of individual interests or connections. Some directors 
and actual controllers of SOCs usurp the takeover opportunity to 
embezzle state assets by acquiring the bidding company’s 
stocks.69 In adjudicating these cases, judges tend to do nothing 
except seek the opinion of the upper level court, because there is 
no specific rule applicable for those poorly trained judges. In 
most cases, because of insufficient law on the duty of care, judges 
are expected to consult across the levels of a court system, and 
thus a local court judge may receive direct guidance from an 
intermediate or high court justice while the case is still before the 
local court: 
Where a case has particular significance, or where the district 
court judge fears reversal, the case may be transferred to the 
next level prior to reaching any decision. Even after a 
decision, however, the appeal to the next level does not give 
deference to the decision, but results in a trial de novo.70  
The result of the inadequate legislation is inefficiency and 
corruption of the judiciary. 
III. A BETTER WAY TO SLICE THE GORDIAN KNOT 
A. The Applicability of the Standards of Review 
Taken together, the issues discussed above turn takeover 
litigation into an onerous task for judges and one with an 
 
company. The provisions are vague and elusive. See Shangshi Gongsi Shougou Guanli 
Banfa (上市公司收购管理办法) [Measures for the Administration of the Takeover of 
Public Companies] (promulgated by the China Securities Regulation Comm’n, July 31, 
2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006) http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=
112131. 
69. Wang Junfang, Dui Guoyou Zhongxiaoxing Qiye Guanliceng Shougou de Sikao (对国
有中小型企业管理层收购的思考) [Thoughts on Management-Buyouts of Small and Middle 
Sized State Owned Companies], 9 DANGDAI JINGJIREN 86, 86 (2006). 
70. See Sam Hanson, The Chinese Century: An American Judge’s Observations of the 
Chinese Legal System, 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 243, 250–51 (2001). 
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uncertain outcome for the parties because of the interference of 
local government or other interests. Although corporate China 
and legal academia have made many suggestions to rectify the 
problems, little system-wide reform has been introduced or 
effectively implemented. 71  Given that most of the solutions 
demand tremendous legislative efforts or a series of drastic 
judicial  and  political  reforms,72  they  are  met  with  little 
enthusiasm among government representatives. Because so many 
changes are needed to improve the adjudication of takeover 
disputes, people regard these temptations as uneconomical. 
However, the business judgment rule and the “defensive” 
business judgment rule prove a better way to slice the Gordian 
Knot. This does not mean that the importation of these two 
standards of review into Chinese law will eliminate all the issues 
analyzed above. However, it will provide the judiciary with a 
vehicle to circumvent the most persistent problems so as to keep 
the judiciary from predicaments in the adjudication of takeover 
cases. 
The business judgment rule and the “defensive” business 
judgment rule are standards of review under which judges must 
abstain from reviewing the substantive merits of directors’ or 
officers’ decisions.73 In current Chinese judicial practice, judges 
actively review the managerial decisions and impose their own 
value judgments on substantive business decisions. Frequent 
judicial meddling into the managerial decisions, as previously 
mentioned, leads to undue risk aversion for the decision-
makers.74 Application of the standards of review will be helpful to 
judges deciding takeover cases in three main ways. Currently, 
judges face the problem of lack of professionalization. Even well-
 
71. See Grimheden, supra note 40, at 1008–09; see also Renmin Fayuan Wunian 
Gaige Gangyao (人民法院五年改革纲要) [Five Year Reform Platform of People’s 
Courts], supra note 47; Qianfan Zhang, The People’s Court in Transition: The Prospect of the 
Chinese Judicial Reform, 12 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 69, 87 (2003); Zou Keyuan, Judicial Reform 
in China: Recent Developments and Future Prospects, 36 INT’L LAW. 1039, 1045–46 (2002) 
(discussing selection criteria for judges). 
72. See Dong Hao, Sifa Gaige dui Zhengzhi Tizhi Gaige Jincheng de Po yu Li (司法改革
对政治体制改革进程的破与立) [Judicial Reform in Light of the Abolishment and 
Establishment of the Political Reform Process], 3 FAZHI LUNCONG 1 (2009) (discussing 
the strong interrelationship between judicial and political systematic reformations and 
the tremendous changes necessary for judicial and political systematic reforms in order 
to achieve a better adjudication environment). 
73. See Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 90. 
74. See Eisenberg, supra note 12, at 542–44. 
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trained US judges should refrain from making substantive 
business decisions because of asymmetrical business information 
and knowledge; the case is stronger for Chinese judges with only 
military or history education backgrounds. Transplantation of 
the business judgment rule and the “defensive” business 
judgment rule as standards of review for takeover cases will 
alleviate the professionalization problem in the Chinese 
judiciary. Judges should only evaluate whether the decision-
making process fits the prerequisites of these standards of review. 
If they fit, the court must abstain from making the substantive 
business decision itself, and it may not question the 
reasonableness, complete or in part, of the decision of the 
director or officer. 
Second, the requirements of the new standards of review will 
reduce the judicial burden not only for decision-makers, but also 
for the fact-finding judges. Tremendous social resources will be 
saved. Business decision-makers in proceedings will not need to 
gather significant outside professional opinions for litigation and 
they would be more than happy to consult outside professionals, 
such as accountants and investment bankers, before making any 
decision. 
Third, the independence of judges will be bolstered because 
it is harder for outside parties to affect judges’ decisions on the 
requirements as opposed to substantive business judgments.75 
The ability to make substantive business judgments awards the 
non-independent judiciary with excessive discretion, which is 
easier for local interests to exploit. 
The beneficiaries of the importation of the standards of 
review are not only individuals, but the whole court system as 
well. From the perspective of resource allocation, when the local 
government or other local interests try to compel courts to make 
a favorable judgment, there must inevitably be conflicting 
interests between local governments. The main reason the 
central government does not directly intervene to dampen 
adverse interference by the local government is that the central 
government can adjust that influence through the hierarchy of 
 
75. An articulate juridical power boundary will help local courts maintain their 
independence and better enforce judicial power. See Ma Huaide, Difang Baohuzhuyi de 
Chengyin he Jiejue zhi Dao (地方保护主义的成因和解决之道) [Causes and Solutions of Local 
Protectionism], 6 ZHENGFA LUNTAN 156, 158–60 (2003). 
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Party organization, such as the Central Political and Legal 
Committee (Zhongyang zhenfa weiyuanhui), whenever the judicial 
decisions will jeopardize the interests of the central government. 
However, such mechanisms are inefficient and onerous. As 
discussed above, the costs and benefits of enacting a series of laws 
to abate local influence on the court is uneconomical, especially 
for takeover cases. In looking back on the history of corporate 
America, it is easy to find conflicts between state and federal 
interests as well. Eventually, the state had to obey the superior 
interests of the nation.76 In political terms, application of the two 
standards of review, which can decrease the excessive discretion 
of judges on business judgment, will be the red flag to the local 
governments’ local protectionism. That will reduce political 
pressure on local courts in weighty takeover cases. 
New standards of review will also temporarily help alleviate 
the legislative predicament. China falls within the family of 
continental law countries, where the main source of law is 
statutes and where judicial precedents have hardly any binding 
effect.77  Therefore,  legislation  in  those  states  needs  to  be 
articulate and specific. Any legislative default or gap will cause 
serious application problems. Sometimes, the gap and default 
will give the judiciary excessive discretion, which can cause 
corruption.78 As analyzed before, Chinese legislation on the duty 
of care is an outstanding example. However, the application of 
new standards of review will provide a buffer zone for the 
predicament of the lack of the duty of care. As with abstention 
doctrines, the business judgment rule and the “defensive” 
business judgment rule will significantly cut down on the 
 
76. For instance, in Time-Warner, the Delaware court changed its attitude from pro-
takeover to anti-takeover. This drastic shift occurred because Delaware “lives in the 
constant fear that Congress will usurp its authority in corporate law” in order to 
“throw[] cool water on the takeover market.” See Skeel, supra note 19, at 138. Fear of the 
reallocation of legislative right is the main reason.  
77 . See SHEN ZONGLIN, BIJIAO FA YANJIU (比较法研究 ) [RESEARCH ON 
COMPARATIVE LAW] 142 (1998). 
78. See supra notes 70–76 and accompanying text (discussing the problems that 
occur as a result of gaps in Chinese legislation). Given the low standards for judge 
nomination, it would be very dangerous to allocate to the judiciary too much discretion 
on such specialized corporate law. See supra notes 43–49 and accompanying text 
(describing the low standards for nomination). Excessive discretion, under the current 
situation, will foment more corruption. See supra note 75 and accompanying text 
(explaining the discretion of judges at each level of the Chinese court system). 
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application  of  the  incomplete  duty of  care  provisions79 in 
takeover cases. More importantly, with specific guidelines for the 
new standards of review, judges will not need to consult across 
the levels of the court system and try to solicit guidance from 
their superiors. The fewer judges that solicit opinions from their 
superiors, the fewer number of de novo trials there will be. 
B. Crucial Work before Application 
The standards of review are not elixirs for corporate China. 
However, they are optimal solutions for corporate China to 
temporarily solve the problems with takeover adjudication. 
China’s political situation and legal system, after all, are different 
from those of the United States. Whether an imported legal 
vehicle can be successfully transplanted depends on a detailed 
examination of the compatibility of the vehicle, its rationale, and 
proper modification based on that examination. Having studied 
the business judgment rule, the “defensive” business judgment 
rule and their rationales at a glance, efforts will be made in the 
remaining two sections to tailor such rules to the environment of 
corporate China. 
1. Specificity of the Business Judgment Rule 
The business judgment rule is a common-law standard of 
review and is supported by a galaxy of related precedents. Judges 
only need to look to previous explanations of the conditions, 
such as the extent to which the decision is believed to be an 
informed one, in order to apply the business judgment rule. 
However, in China, precedents are neither binding, nor 
persuasive. As such, the business judgment rule should be more 
specific. However, the issue is not whether if the rule needs to be 
more specific, but how to make the rule more specific. 
Australia offers a famous example of transplanting the 
business judgment rule. In the early 1990s, Australian business 
interests began campaigning for a statutory business judgment 
rule. 80   However,  Australians  made  some  substantive 
modifications, due to their loyalty to English and Australian legal 
 
79. See supra Part II.C. 
80. Douglas M. Branson & Low Chee Keong, Balancing the Scales: A Statutory 
Business Judgment Rule for Hong Kong?, 34 HONG KONG L.J. 303, 318 (2004). 
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precedents. This turned the rule into a quasi-substantive 
standard.81 A scholar commented that this modification functions 
as the “[r]eintroduction of a quasi-subjective element, namely 
motive[,] by enquiring whether the director took the action for a 
proper purpose, [which] robs the business judgment rule of a 
measure of its utility.”82  Therefore,  the  tendency  to  infuse 
substantive standards into the formal rule should be prevented. 
What is worse, if the rule is not specific enough for application, 
judges will have excessive discretion, which would negate one of 
the original purposes of the transplantation. 
Among the four aforementioned prerequisites to the 
business judgment rule, the “informed” and “good faith” 
conditions need further clarification in order to make up for the 
lack of case law. To advance the understanding of “informed 
decision,” China can borrow the term’s definition from the 
Model Business Corporation Act, which says that decision-makers 
should be “informed to the extent the director reasonably 
believed  appropriate  under  the  circumstances.”83  A  more 
detailed definition of “informed condition” will keep the 
decision-makers from making reckless and unreasonable 
decisions under specific circumstances and ensure that they 
make reasonable decisions. 
The same rationale applies to the “good faith” condition. 
China can look to In re the Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation84 
from the Delaware Supreme Court for inspiration, which 
provides a wonderful example of “good faith.” The “good faith” 
requirement is identified with the subjective intent of the 
decision-makers to further the best interests of the corporation.85 
It epitomized what good faith is in the broad picture of business 
 
81. See id. at 317. They added language from English and Australian precedents 
that the business decision must be made “in good faith for a proper purpose.” The 
expression “for a proper purpose” turns the procedural review into a substantive one. 
82. Id. 
83. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31 ( 2008). 
84. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
85. See Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: 
Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398, 402 (2007); 
see also In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (en 
banc) (discussing good faith requirements in terms of the chancery court’s description 
of “a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its 
shareholders” (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755 (Del. Ch. 2005))). 
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decision making and whose interests the directors and officers 
should pursue. With these specified prerequisites, the business 
judgment rule will be more explicit and more effective in solving 
the current judicial problems in takeover cases. 
2. Guideline to the “Defensive” Business Judgment Rule 
Just as discussed in Section I.B, there is no “defensive” 
business judgment rule in US corporate law. However, the rules 
governing the target corporation in a hostile takeover exist in 
case law. For legislators in the United States, the most common 
job is to summarize, trim, and codify the rules. Nevertheless, 
before transplanting the rules, the institutional choice—whether 
pro-bidder or pro-defender—should be decided. Opinion in the 
United States in the 1990s was split between pro-bidder or pro-
defender. 
It is not hard to discover that the attitudes of Delaware 
courts towards takeover cases changed in the 1990s because of 
the pressure from the federal government.86 After Paramount 
Communications,  Inc.  v.  Time  Inc.,87  the  pro-defender  attitude 
attracted more world-class conglomerates and major US 
corporations to incorporate in Delaware, which produces a 
considerable amount of Delaware’s revenue in the form of 
incorporation and franchise fees.88 Obviously, the attraction of 
the pro-defender policy is the main impetus pushing these 
behemoths to choose Delaware, because the policy stabilizes the 
market and makes the corporate future predicable. China is an 
incorporating jurisdiction in the sense that non-Chinese entities 
systematically seek incorporation within China’s borders, which 
has been proven throughout the years by marketing and 
empirical research. The Chinese government also actively 
promotes such incorporations. Chinese companies also are 
actively seeking incorporation within China and may do so 
increasingly in the future. The latitude to adopt takeover 
defenses against hostile takeovers is an attractive feature of an 
incorporating jurisdiction. Therefore, China should adopt a pro-
defender policy in order to attract more incorporation. Given 
 
86. See SKEEL, supra note 19, at 138. 
87. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).  
88. See DEL. DEP’T OF FIN., DELAWARE FISCAL NOTEBOOK (2009) passim, available at 
http://finance.delaware.gov/publications/fiscal_notebook_09/fiscal_notebook_09.pdf. 
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that China is a centralist country rather than federalist country, 
furthering incorporation will help not only the development of 
the local economy, but also the national economy as a whole. 
CONCLUSION 
The business judgment rule and the “defensive” business 
judgment rule have strong applicability to corporate China. The 
application of these standards of review will help the Chinese 
judiciary tackle professionalization and independence issues. 
Additionally, the issue of inadequate legislation on the duty of 
care will be circumvented temporarily. Under the current 
political and economic picture, and given that massive legislation 
and judicial revolution on takeover cases is impossible and 
cannot be achieved in a short period of time, the transplantation 
of the new standards of review will create a buffer zone for 
takeover dispute adjudication so as to provide interim reform of 
the whole judicial system. Last but not least, the proper specificity 
of the business judgment rule and the guidelines of the 
“defensive” business judgment rule should be considered before 
applying the new standard of review in China. 
